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Abstract 
In this research, we empirically investigate the payoff of aggressive bidding in an online 
auction. To address our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset 
containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid 
auctions. Our research design allows us to isolate the impact of bidding aggressively in 
an attempt to signal a high valuation on the probability to win an auction. In 
particular, we analyze more than 600,000 bids placed manually by approximately 
2,600 distinct auction participants. The strong and significantly negative effect of 
aggressive bidding on the likelihood of winning an auction revealed by our analysis 
suggests that an aggressive bidding strategy is not beneficial in increasing the chances 
of winning an online auction. 
Keywords:  Internet Markets, Electronic Markets, Auctions, Aggressive Bidding, Jump 
Bidding. 
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Introduction 
“Another issue related to bidding strategy is whether to be bold or cautious in opening bidding. The man 
who strongly desires an item will jump in with both feet, as it were, or try to rout the enemy by starting 
out with a high, possibly loud, bid intended to “knock out” his opponents. Sometimes he even tops his 
own bid. This approach may discourage competitors at the outset and prevent them from ever getting 
caught up in the spirit of the bidding. In a very different strategy, a prospective buyer, even though 
determined to purchase an item, bids tentatively and cautiously in order to feel out the opposition. He 
hopes that by indicating a low regard for the offering he will lull opponents into a false sense of 
security.” (Cassady 1967)  
“… he bid seventy-five grand for the land when the other operators were offering bids in the low fifties…. 
Naturally he got it … and made himself a sweet little bundle. After he bought it, I told him he could have 
got it for twenty thousand less, and you know what he said? ‘I never try to buy a property as cheap as 
possible. That way you’re in competition with the other operators. They keep kicking each other up and 
before you know it, you’re paying more than you intended and more than it’s worth to me, and that’s 
what I offer. That way you discourage the competition. It takes the heart right out of him.” –Harry 
Kemelman, Wednesday the Rabbi Got Wet. (Avery 1998) 
Cassady describes two contrasting ways of placing bids in an auction: Bidders can adopt either an 
aggressive or a cautious bidding strategy. In an aggressive strategy, bidders try to signal a high valuation 
of the auctioned product and, thus, aim to discourage potential competitors from the outset. By contrast, 
in a cautious strategy, tentative bidders intend to conceal their valuation for as long as possible. This 
bidding strategy is also referred to as ratchet bidding, straightforward bidding, or pedestrian bidding. 
The quote by Harry Kemelman may be taken as anecdotal evidence that aggressive bidding strategies 
promise a positive return for the respective bidder. However, Kemelman cannot be sure that he wins 
because of his aggressive bidding strategy. It is also possible that he is simply the bidder with the highest 
valuation of the auctioned product and, thus, could also have won with a lower bid and a more cautious 
bidding strategy.  
The existence of aggressive bidding strategies – typically called jump bidding – in ascending price 
auctions has been covered extensively in the scientific literature (e.g., Avery 1998; Easley and Tenorio 
2004). Cramton (1997) defines jump bidding as “the act of raising a high bid by much more than the 
minimum increment”. Empirical studies suggest that such bidding behavior occurs on a very frequent 
basis. For example, Easley and Tenorio (2004) report that more than 30% of the bidders in their sample 
submit jump bids. Not surprisingly, a significant literature has emerged, analyzing these strategies 
theoretically and empirically (for an extensive literature review see, e.g., Raviv 2008). In general, 
signaling (e.g., Avery 1998; Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998) and impatience (e.g., Isaac et al. 2007) have been 
named as potential explanations for jump bidding. However, none of the existing studies empirically 
investigated the impact of jump bids as a way of signaling one’s own valuation on the actual likelihood to 
win an auction. Thus, the question, whether Kemelman won the auction because of his bidding strategy or 
merely because of his high valuation of the land, has until today remained unanswered. This gap in the 
literature may be explained by the fact that it is not easy to distinguish between jump bids that are 
attributable to impatience and jump bids that are attributable to signaling.  
Online pay-per-bid auctions (e.g., beezid.com, bidcactus.com)1, which constitute a variant of ascending 
price auctions, have seen a significant rise in recent years. The increase in this type of auctions helps to 
overcome the above-mentioned challenge. Each such auction starts at a price of zero and with a fixed end 
time on a countdown clock. Auction participants are restricted to bidding a fixed bid increment (e.g., 1 
cent) above the current bid and must pay a non-refundable fixed fee (e.g., 50 cents) for each bid placed. 
Each bid extends the duration of the auction by a given time increment (e.g., 10 seconds). For example, in 
an auction where the current bid is $2.32 with 12 seconds on the auction countdown, an additional bid 
                                                             
1 In September 2011, 5.5 million unique visitors visited pay-per-bid auction websites. This corresponds to 7.3% of the 
unique visitors on the biggest auction website worldwide – ebay.com (Platt et al. 2012). 
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increases the current bid by 1 cent to $2.33 and extends the auction countdown by 10 seconds.2 The 
participant who places the bid has to pay the fixed bidding fee of 50 cents. A participant wins the auction 
if her bid is not followed by another bid. The winner has to pay the current bid (in addition to the bidding 
fees already paid) to obtain the item. If the participant in our example is the last bidder, she would win the 
auctioned product for $2.33.  
As with other auction formats, bidders in a pay-per-bid auction can adopt aggressive bidding strategies. 
But, unlike with other auction formats, bidders cannot use typical jump bids to signal a high valuation 
since the bidding increment is fixed. However, bidders can use the timing of their bids as a signaling 
device. Instead of delaying until the last second of an auction, auction participants can re-raise the current 
bid immediately after another auction participant has placed their bid.  
By its very design this specific auction format enables us to isolate the effect of an aggressive bidding 
strategy, used to signal a high valuation, on the likelihood of winning an auction. As each placed bid 
extends the duration of a pay-per-bid auction by the same amount of time, the respective bidding 
strategies have no influence on the total duration of an auction. Consequently, in this auction format, 
aggressive bidding cannot be caused by an auction participant's impatience but must be attributable to 
their attempt of signaling a high valuation for the auctioned product in order to try to increase their 
chances of winning.  
To summarize, our research setup allows us to examine the impact of this specific form of aggressive 
bidding on the likelihood of winning an auction, and in particular, to answer the following research 
question: What effect does aggressive bidding in a pay-per-bid auction have on the bidders’ chances of 
winning an auction?  
Our explicit aim is to consider the inherent usefulness of aggressive bidding as a strategy for increasing 
the chances of winning an online auction. In other words, we aim to empirically resolve the incongruity of 
the conclusions drawn from various theoretical studies. In particular, prior theoretical studies (e.g., Avery 
1998; Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998), as well as anecdotes provided by Avery (1998) suggest an inherently 
positive payoff from aggressive bidding, whereas the simulation study by Bapna et al. (2003) suggests a 
(slightly) negative payoff from such bidding behavior. In addition, studies in support of bidders’ 
impatience as a cause of aggressive bidding imply that the payoff is insignificant (e.g., Isaac et al. 2005; 
Isaac et al. 2007). Our research, therefore, seeks to add to the existing literature on aggressive bidding 
strategies in the following way: By analyzing aggressive bidding in a pay-per-bid auction context, we are 
able to rule out impatience as a reason for aggressive bidding. This, then, allows us to be the first to 
provide an empirical answer to the question of whether signaling aggressiveness is a useful strategy to 
increase the chances of winning an online auction. Considering the different theoretical predictions on the 
effect of aggressive bidding and the vast number of aggressively placed bids, this answer would offer new 
insights relevant to information systems and behavioral economics research that will benefit both 
practitioners and researchers.  
To answer our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset provided by a German website 
offering pay-per-bid auctions. This dataset includes detailed customer level bidding and transaction data 
from approximately 7,000 auctions conducted between August 2009 and May 2010. The main result of 
our analysis is as follows: Controlling for the total investment of an auction participant, we find that the 
likelihood of winning an auction is significantly influenced by a participant’s bidding strategy. Contrary to 
the prediction that aggressive bidders increase their chances of winning an auction, we find a strong and 
significant negative effect of aggressive bidding on the likelihood of winning an auction.  
Literature Review 
There is a substantial stream of research that has examined the concept of jump bidding theoretically, 
empirically, and experimentally. A broad range of studies have highlighted the existence of such bidding 
behavior. In particular, earlier studies have analyzed jump bidding in the context of different types of 
ascending price auctions (e.g., Avery 1998; Banks et al. 2003; Bapna et al. 2003; Carpenter et al. 2011; 
                                                             
2 The time increments add up linearly for each placed bid. For instance, if two bids are placed simultaneously, the 
countdown extends by another 10 seconds to 32 seconds. 
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Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998; Easley and Tenorio 2004; Hörner and Sahuguet 2007; Isaac et al. 2005; 
Isaac et al. 2007; Kwasnica and Katok 2007; Plott and Salmon 2005; Raviv 2008). 
Theoretical studies have identified signaling and impatience as major explanations for jump bidding. 
Avery (1998) shows that jump bids in a common value setting where bidding is not costly can be 
interpreted as coordinative devices among bidders. Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998), Easley and Tenorio 
(2004), and Hörner and Sahuguet (2007) analyze jump bidding in ascending price auctions where 
bidding is costly. In their models, jump bidding follows from the cost of submitting and revising bids. The 
element common to both explanations is that bidders use jump bidding to signal their valuation of the 
auctioned product and, thus, to discourage potential competitors. For example, Avery (1998) writes that 
after a jump bid “… the losing bidder may drop out in equilibrium even though his value is (certain to be) 
strictly larger than the current price.” In his model as well as in the model of Daniel and Hirshleifer 
(1998) jump bids are able to deter competitors with a higher valuation and, thereby, increase jump 
bidders’ chances of winning while simultaneously reducing the expected revenue of the seller. 
Another explanation for jump bidding in ascending auctions is the presence of bidding costs associated 
with the necessary time required to participate in an auction. Bidders may be impatient and, therefore, 
use jump bids to increase the speed of the auction. Banks et al. (2003) state that: “Jump bidding is 
encouraged by impatient bidders who may sacrifice potential profit in their desire to speed-up the pace 
of the auction and reduce their transactions’ cost.”  Based on the observation of small, yet persistent, 
jump bids in the spectrum license auctions conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission 
and 3G spectrum auctions in the UK, Isaac et al. (2007) construct a model in which jump bids occur due 
to impatience. In their model, jump bidding as a result of impatience has no effect on the probability of 
winning an auction and a neutral or even positive effect on seller revenue. 
There are also some empirical and experimental studies on jump bidding in ascending price auctions. On 
the one hand, in an empirical setup, Easley and Tenorio (2004) show that early jump bidding in an 
auction has a negative effect on the total number of bids placed in this auction. The authors interpret this 
finding as indirect evidence for the signaling value of jump bids. On the other hand, Isaac and Schnier 
(2005) as well as Isaac et al. (2005) provide some empirical and experimental evidence that jump bidding 
is driven by impatience of auction participants and, thus, has no or, indeed, may even have a positive 
effect on the end price of an auction. These results are reinforced by Kwasnica and Katok (2007) who find 
that higher bidder impatience results in greater jump bids. Carpenter et al. (2011) experimentally analyze 
the effect of jump bidding on auction revenue in the context of silent auctions. Within their experimental 
design, the authors successfully modify the incentives to use jump bids due to impatience. Consistent with 
Isaac and Schnier (2005) and Isaac et al. (2005) they find that jump bidding due to impatience increases 
auction revenue. Bapna et al. (2003) analyze jump bidding using a simulation framework for Yankee-type 
auctions. Consistent with the impatience hypothesis, they find that jump bidding has no effect on the 
likelihood to win an auction, and, due to the slightly higher average winning bid, even results in a negative 
total payoff for the auction participant. In a recent study, Grether et al. (2011) examine why bidders 
engage in jump bidding in used car markets. However, their study on two different markets arrived at 
contradictory results. In one market, they find support for the impatience explanation, while in the other 
market they find support for the signaling explanation of jump bidding.  
To summarize, signaling and impatience provide two competing theoretical explanations for jump 
bidding in ascending price auctions. While jump bids due to impatience are typically associated with no – 
or even a positive – effect on the end price of an auction (Isaac and Schnier 2007), jump bidding as a 
signal of aggressiveness is associated with a negative effect on this price (Avery 1998; Daniel and 
Hirshleifer 1998). A lower expected end price of an auction increases ceteris paribus the winning 
probability of an auction participant. Thus, the studies of Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) 
both suggest a positive effect of bidding aggressively on the probability of winning an auction while the 
study of Isaac and Schnier (2007) suggest no – or even a negative effect – on this probability. For the 
auctioneer, jump bidding due to impatience has a neutral or positive effect on the auctioneer revenue and 
a negative effect for jump bids due to signaling. The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While most 
of the empirical studies conclude that the main driver for jump bidding is bidder impatience, there is also 
anecdotal and weak empirical evidence that signaling with jump bids can deter other potential 
competitors from participating in an auction. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the higher value of the 
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jump bid increases the winning probability or whether jump bidding by itself induces this effect. In 
addition, it may also be the case that both signaling and impatience are factors that influence jump 
bidding. We are not aware of any empirical study which systematically investigates the signaling value of 
jump bids. 
Research Setup 
Study Design 
When the participants on the website we analyzed are at the point of taking part in an auction they have to 
make several decisions (not necessarily in the following order): they need to decide how many bids they 
want to place, whether they want to place their bids manually or use an automated bidding agent; and if 
they choose to place their bids manually, they also need to decide, on a bid level, the exact point in time 
when they want to place it. In this paper, we concentrate only on timing decisions of manually placed bids.  
In simplified terms, manual bidders can choose between two different strategies for timing their bids. The 
first strategy consists of instantly overbidding other auction participants in an aggressive manner as a way 
of signaling a high valuation of the auctioned product, and thus trying to discourage their potential 
competitors from placing further bids. We call this strategy the aggressive strategy. The second strategy 
involves placing the bids at some random point in time but not immediately after another auction 
participant has placed theirs. We call this second strategy the normal strategy.3 
The aggressive strategy is conceptually very close to jump bidding in ascending price auctions. By 
submitting jump bids, bidders deliberately reveal more information than necessary about their 
(presumably high) valuation of the auctioned good. This comes at the risk of bidding more than the 
minimal winning bid. For example, consider a typical ascending price auction with two bidders and a bid 
increment of $1. The first bidder has a valuation of $20 and the second bidder a valuation of 50$. The 
second bidder could win the auction with a minimal bid of $21. If this bidder submits a jump bid of $25, 
she overbids the minimal winning bid by $4. The same argumentation holds for aggressive bidders in pay-
per-bid auctions: By bidding immediately after another auction participant, bidders reveal their keen 
interest in the bidding process and hence, in winning the auction. Thus, aggressive bidders waive the 
chance of waiting for other auction participants to place their bids. As each bid is costly, this strategy 
comes at the risk of placing more than the required number of bids to win an auction. For example, 
consider a pay-per-bid auction with three remaining bidders. The first bidder is willing to place a 
maximum of 10 additional bids, while the second and the third bidders are willing to place 3 additional 
bids each (all bidders are equally likely to place a bid). If all three bidders were to wait for the last second 
of an auction to place their bids, the first bidder would win the auction by placing 4 additional bids. 
However, by adopting an aggressive strategy, the first bidder needs to place 7 bids to win the auction. 
Dataset 
The data for our study come from a large German website offering pay-per-bid auctions. Our dataset 
contains customer level bidding and transaction data for all auctions conducted between August 28, 2009 
and May 9, 2010. For each auction, we know the auctioned product, a suggested retail price for this 
product, the bid increment, the time increment as well as start and end times. On the participant level, we 
have information about the actual bidding behavior, the exact point in time when a participant placed a 
bid, the date of registration, the complete history of auction participations, as well as some demographics 
like age and gender. Overall, we have data for 482,253 auction participations involving 87,007 distinct 
participants. These participants placed 6,448,708 bids in 6,987 auctions for 408 different products. Bid 
                                                             
3 Apparently, the normal strategy can consist of a subset of different strategies. For example, there may be some 
auction participants who place their bids always in the very last second of an auction (the cautious strategy from the 
introduction). This strategy is typically called sniping (Roth and Ockenfels 2002) and has been documented in several 
theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Bapna 2003; Ely and Hossain 2009). However, due to space restrictions, we 
have to defer the breakdown of the normal strategy into a subset of different strategies to future research and in this 
paper, focus on the distinctions between normal and the aggressive strategies.  
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increments are 0.01€ for 74%, 0.02€ for 15%, 0.05€ for 9% and 0.10€ for 2% of the auctions. The bidding 
fee is constant at 0.50€ for each auction while the time increment varies between 10 and 20 seconds.  
Main Variables 
We measure the aggressively and normally placed bids, respectively, with the variables Ratio Aggressive, 
and Ratio Normal. The variables are calculated as follows: For each manually placed bid we determine 
whether the respective auction participant placed their bid aggressively or normally. We identify a bid as 
aggressive if it is placed within 3 seconds after the previous bid. All bids that are placed more than 3 
seconds after the foregone bid are characterized as normally placed. To account for potential product 
specific effects, we multiply the respective aggregated number of aggressively and normally placed bids by 
the fixed bidding fee and divide the results by the suggested retail price of the auctioned product.  
As control variables, we include the variable Ratio Agent to account for the number of bids placed using 
an automated bidding agent. Analogous to the variables Ratio Aggressive and Ratio Normal this variable 
is calculated as the product of the number of bids placed using an automated bidding agent and the fixed 
bidding fee, divided by the suggested retail price of the auctioned product. To account for potential time-
varying heterogeneity across auction participants, we include the variables Number of Participations and 
Number of Wins as historical experience measures in our model. Number of Participations is defined as 
the number of participations by a specific participant in different auctions since the day of registration. 
Number of Wins is defined as the aggregated number of wins of this participant. Such experience 
measures are widely used to control for customer heterogeneity in both the marketing literature and 
industry practices (Anderson and Simester 2004; De et al. 2010). Furthermore, there may be effects on 
the winning probability arising from the auction’s end time. Especially in pay-per-bid auctions, it is 
crucial for bidders to closely track the auction to the very end. There may also be less competition in 
auctions which are set to end during nighttime hours. Accordingly, we divide the day into four 6 hour 
intervals, starting at midnight, and include three dummy variables (Midnight – 6 a.m. Dummy, 6 a.m. – 
Noon Dummy, Noon – 6 p.m. Dummy) to control for the end time of the auction.  
Empirical Analysis 
Basic Model 
We use a conditional fixed effects logistic regression model to examine the impact of aggressive bidding 
on the likelihood of winning an auction.4 The dependent variable for this analysis is a binary variable 
equaling one, if an auction participant wins an auction. In our model specification, the individual specific 
fixed effects allow us to control for any individual, specific, time constant unobserved heterogeneity 
(Hsiao 2003). We do not present the results of a random effects model as we expect the individual specific 
effects to be correlated with our explanatory variables. For example, a very assertive person may bid more 
aggressively while participating in a pay-per-bid auction. This would imply a high correlation between the 
individual specific effect and the variable Ratio Aggressive. For random effects models, such correlation is 
not allowed (Wooldridge 2010). Confirming our expectation, the result of a Hausman test (1978) shows 
that the individual specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables.5 
The variables of interest for this analysis are Ratio Aggressive, and Ratio Normal. As additionally placed 
bids should increase the probability of winning an auction irrespective of the bidding strategy used, we 
expect a positive coefficient for both of these variables. If the coefficient for Ratio Aggressive turns out to 
be significantly larger than the coefficient for Ratio Normal, this would indicate a positive effect of an 
aggressive bidding strategy on the likelihood of winning an auction. In this case, bidders could use an 
                                                             
4 All of our results are robust to random effects logit, fixed effects probit, and random and fixed effects linear 
probability models as well. 
5 The value of the Hausman test statistic is negative for the logit models (-8,157). Following the suggestion of 
Schreiber (2008), we use the absolute value of this statistic to decide about the appropriateness of the random effects 
model. For the linear probability model the test statistic is positive (1,318) and highly significant providing further 
evidence for the correlation between the individual specific effects and the explanatory variables. 
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aggressive bidding strategy effectively to signal a high valuation and, thus, increase their chances of 
winning an auction. We further add the control variables introduced above. Therefore, we consider the 
following model in latent variable form (Wooldridge 2010): 
∗    	
	  
        
  1 ∗  0, 
(1) 
 
 
  is a dummy variable equaling one if a participant i wins an auction j; 
	 denotes the variable Ratio 
Aggressive; 
 denotes the variable Ratio Normal;   is a set of dummy variables indicating individual 
fixed effects;   is a vector of control variables; and   is the random error term. This model will 
consistently estimate the effects of the different bidding strategies on the winning probability if 

 ,   0. 
Note that our model specification controls for all the time-invariant factors, including any inherent 
differences between participants. More importantly, the individual fixed effects, along with the time-
variant participant specific variables, Number of Participations and Number of Wins, collectively address 
concerns regarding the self-selection of auction participants who make use of aggressive bidding 
strategies. Thus, this model allows us to address endogeneity concerns on the individual level in a 
meaningful and robust manner (Allison 2005). 
Sample 
As the conditional fixed effects model requires variation in the independent variable (Wooldridge 2010), 
we restrict our sample to individuals who participated in at least two auctions and won at least once but 
not in each of their participations. This leaves us with a sample of 2,601 distinct individuals who totaled 
72,752 participations in different auctions, and an average of 28 participations per individual. Within 
these participations, auction participants placed in total 226,852 aggressive and 417,952 normal bids. The 
individuals in our sample won a total of 6,972 auctions. To summarize, our sample is an unbalanced panel 
data consisting of 2,601 individuals and 72,752 observations. Table 1 lists summary statistics for this 
sample.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. 50th Pctl. 75th Pctl. Max 
Winner 0.0958 0.2943 0 0 0 1 
Ratio Aggressive 0.0137 0.0505 0 0 0.0075 2.34 
Ratio Normal 0.0248 0.0710 0 0.0038 0.0185 3.36 
Ratio Bidding Agent 0.0754 0.1901 0 0 0.0393 2.89 
Number of Participations 33.36 54.15 3 14 38 462 
Number of Wins 2.83 5.53 0 1 3 50 
Midnight – 6 a.m. Dummy 0.1541 0.3612 0 0 0 1 
6 a.m. – Noon Dummy 0.1238 0.3293 0 0 0 1 
Noon – 6 p.m. Dummy 0.3161 0.4650 0 0 1 1 
 
Preliminary Results 
The first column of Table 2 presents the estimates of the conditional fixed effects model. The coefficients 
on Ratio Aggressive, Ratio Normal, and Ratio Agent are all positive and significant. In particular, we 
have estimated coefficients of 0.4642 (s.e.=0.2661) for Ratio Aggressive, 3.5150 (s.e.=0.1921) for Ratio 
Economics and Value of IS 
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Normal, and 1.3548 (s.e.= 0.0583) for Ratio Agent. As we estimate a logistic regression model, the 
coefficients cannot be interpreted as the change in the mean of   for a one unit increase in the respective 
predictor variable, with all other predictors remaining constant. Rather, they can be interpreted as the 
natural logarithm of a multiplying factor by which the predicted odds of   1 change, given a one unit 
increase in the predictor variable, holding all other predictor variables constant.6  
 
Table 2. Preliminary Results 
Variable Main Model 
Controlling for Product 
Specific Effects 
Ratio Aggressive 
0.4642* 0.5882** 
 
(0.2661) (0.2676) 
Ratio Normal 
3.5150*** 2.6336*** 
(0.1921) (0.1989) 
Ratio Bidding Agent 
1.3548*** 1.3677*** 
(0.0584) (0.0612) 
Number of Participations 
0.0101*** 0.0107*** 
(0.0008) (0.0009) 
Number of Wins 
-0.0854*** -0.0844*** 
(0.0063) (0.0066) 
Midnight – 6 a.m. Dummy 
-0.6369*** -0.4828*** 
(0.0491) (0.0559) 
6 a.m. – Noon Dummy 
0.3823*** 0.3311*** 
(0.0416) (0.0495) 
Noon – 6 p.m. Dummy 
0.1854*** 0.1533*** 
(0.0320) (0.0379) 
Individual Fixed Effects   
Product Fixed Effects   
Log likelihood -16,685.19 -15,859.09 
Number of observations 72,752 72,752 
Number of participants 2,601 2,601 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Given this interpretation and congruent with our expectations, all coefficients imply a positive effect of an 
additionally placed bid on the probability of winning an auction. In particular, a one percentage point 
increase in our bidding variables increases the odds of winning by 0.5% for aggressively placed bids, 3.5% 
for normally placed bids, and 1.4% for bids placed using an automated bidding agent. As can be seen from 
these estimates, the effect of aggressively placed bids on the likelihood of winning an auction is 
substantially lower than for bids placed following a normal bidding strategy, as well as for bids placed 
using an automated bidding agent. This difference is highly significant for Ratio Normal (χ2 = 55.72, 
p < .001) as well as for Ratio Agent (χ2 = 10.66, p < .01). Thus, compared to the normal bidding strategy, 
our estimates suggest that aggressive bidding is not beneficial in further increasing the chances of winning 
                                                             
6 The odds are defined as 
 !"#	$
	% !"#	$
. 
 Herrmann et. al. / Does it Pay Off to Bid Aggressively 
  
 Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012 9 
an auction. In contrast, these first findings indicate that following an aggressive bidding strategy has a 
significant negative effect on the likelihood of winning a pay-per-bid auction. Comparing the coefficient 
for the normal bidding strategy with the coefficient of the aggressive bidding strategy shows that a bidder 
could achieve the same increase in the winning probability with either seven aggressively placed bids or 
with just one normally placed bid. We further investigate this result in the next subsection. 
Considering Product Specific Effects 
One may argue that the estimated coefficients are influenced by potential product specific effects. For 
example, in a recent study of pay-per-bid auctions, Platt et al. (2012) find deviating bidding behavior for 
products from the category videogames in their dataset. We address this issue by adding 407 product 
specific fixed effects to our model. The second column in Table 2 shows the estimates for this robustness 
check.  Still, the coefficients of interest remain positive and significant and the coefficient on Ratio 
Aggressive (0.5882, s.e.=0.2676) is significantly smaller (χ2 = 24.72, p < .001) than the coefficients on 
Ratio Normal (2.6336, s.e.=0.1989). These results indicate that the coefficients in column (1) of Table 2 at 
least partly reflect product specific effects for our main variables. Nevertheless, our main result remains 
qualitatively unchanged for this robustness check. Still, the aggressive bidding strategy performs 
significantly worse than the normal bidding strategy. Thus, we have confirmation for our claim that the 
aggressiveness bidding strategy has a negative effect on the chances of winning an auction 
Conclusion and Ongoing Research 
The existence of aggressive bidding strategies such as jump bidding has been proven theoretically and 
empirically. In general, signaling (e.g., Avery 1998; Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998) and impatience (e.g., 
Isaac et al. 2007) have been named as potential explanations for jump bidding. It is surprising, then, that 
there has not been any empirical research to date on how aggressive bidding caused by the attempt to 
signal a high valuation affects one’s likelihood of winning an auction. This research-in-progress paper 
attempts to fill this void in the literature. Our analysis shows the seemingly counterintuitive finding that, 
controlling for the total investment of an auction participant, aggressive bidding has a negative effect on a 
participant's winning probability. Supporting the results of Bapna et al. (2003), our study suggests that 
bidding aggressively is not an effective tool for increasing the chances of winning an auction. Further 
research, particularly experimental studies that randomly manipulate participants’ bidding strategies, 
would be able to present additional evidence for this effect in other auction formats. 
The results presented in this paper have important implications for bidders in pay-per-bid as well as in 
ascending price auctions. Our findings suggest that bidders in pay-per-bid auctions perform substantially 
worse if they use aggressive bidding as a strategic tool to increase their chances of winning an auction. 
Given the substantial amount of aggressively spent bids, aggressive bidders could ceteris paribus 
substantially increase their chances of winning an auction by utilizing a normal bidding strategy. 
Transferring this to a typical ascending price auction, our results suggest that, apart from speeding up the 
auction and, thereby, incurring fewer costs associated with the bidding process, there is no additional – 
and possibly a negative – value in adopting an aggressive bidding strategy. 
We plan to extend this research-in-progress paper in three major ways. First, we plan to investigate why 
the aggressively placed bids have such a large negative effect on one’s likelihood of winning an auction. 
This calls for a more in-depth analysis of the strategic bidding behavior in pay-per-bid auctions. Second, 
we want to investigate the effects of aggressive bidding on the overall investments on an auction level. 
With this analysis, we hope to provide an answer to the question of whether aggressive bidding increases 
or decreases the total auction revenue. Preliminary results of this analysis show that aggressive bidding 
has a positive effect on the auctioneer revenue. In addition, our preliminary auction level results indicate 
that a higher proportion of aggressively placed bids are positively correlated with the number of 
participants in an auction. This finding provides a first indication that our results can be explained by the 
inability of an aggressive bidder to deter competitors. Third, there may be lessons for participants in pay-
per-bid auctions. It would be interesting to analyze the different bidding strategies displayed on our 
auction website from a learning perspective.  
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